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Competing to Cut Carbon: State Policies, 
Conflicts with Federally-Regulated Energy 
Markets, and recommendations 
Arshak Zakarian 
INTRODUCTION 
Wholesale power markets currently face challenges from changes in 
federal regulations and advancements in technology, which have 
significantly changed the composition of energy generation sources across 
the United States over the last two decades.1  States have relied 
increasingly on policy to increase the presence of clean energy sources in 
their power mix, such as nuclear energy, due to its reliability and 
environmental benefits.2  Natural gas, wind, and solar have seen 
unprecedented growth in the last five years due to declining fuel source and 
technology costs.3  Utilities companies and private companies have 
invested significantly in infrastructure and technology research, attempting 
to find success in the ever-changing wholesale power markets. 
Nuclear power has struggled to become economically competitive as a 
source of energy for electricity generation in the United States.  The federal 
government has provided substantial subsidies for renewable energy, while 
subsidies for coal and nuclear have declined.4  Additionally, with the recent 
 
  Arshak Zakarian, J.D., UC Hastings College of the Law (2018); B.S., Environmental 
Economics and Policy, UC Berkeley (2013). I would like to thank Abraham Cable, Professor of Law, 
for his supervision and feedback on this Note and Sierra Martinez, Adjunct Professor and Program 
Director at the Energy Foundation, for his course in Energy Law and introduction to this issue. I also 
wish to acknowledge the Hastings Business Law Journal Editorial Board for their support in editing this 
Note. 
 1. Paul Hibbard et al., Electricity Markets, Reliability and the Evolving U.S. Power System, at 6, 
Analysis Group (June 2017), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing 
/ag_markets_reliability_final_june_2017.pdf. 
 2. See Gavin Bade, 10 trends shaping the electric utility industry in 2017, UTILITYDIVE (Jan. 
23, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/10-trends-shaping-the-electric-utility-industry-in-2017/ 
434541/ [https://perma.cc/BY6G-8LC8]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Rep. Lamar Smith, Tax Subsidies For Renewables Now Far Outpaces Fossil Fuels, Real 
Clear Energy (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2017/04/28/tax_subsidies_for_ 
renewables_now_far_outpaces_fossil_fuels_110217.html [https://perma.cc/PY2J-X7HY]. 
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natural gas boom and influx of renewable energy sources, the price of 
electricity has dropped, resulting in lower profit margins and increased 
competition.5  New developments in technology and regulations have 
raised legal questions about the Federal Power Act (FPA) that have not 
been answered by the courts or federal agencies.  The FPA, adopted in 
1935, leaves ambiguity about the regulation of intricate components of the 
energy system and the roles of states and regional commissions in 
encouraging competition and ensuring environmental benefits. 
New York and Illinois, states that were home to early growth in the 
electricity sector, have recently challenged the boundaries of state authority 
over energy markets and drafted legislation to protect in-state nuclear 
energy generation by providing payments in the form of zero emission 
credits (ZECs).6  Energy market participants and administrators claim that 
these subsidies have potential to impact regional energy markets and 
private investment permanently over the long-term, activities over which 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) arguably retains 
authority.  However, federal district courts in both New York and Illinois 
have recently upheld state programs intended to incentivize carbon-free 
electricity generation sources to participate in federally-regulated power 
markets.7 
Part I of this Note will provide background on federal and state 
regulation of the energy industry, focusing on key pieces of federal 
legislation, FERC orders, and technological advancements in the energy 
sector. 
Part II will provide an overview of the nuclear energy industry and the 
wholesale power markets in which New York and Illinois operate.  Part II 
will also provide an overview of the state programs intended to incentivize 
nuclear power. 
Part III will discuss FERC authority over wholesale power markets,  
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and recent case law regarding the New 
York and Illinois nuclear subsidy programs.  Part III will also discuss 
recent proposals addressing potential market distortions from these 
programs and conclude that successful integration of federal and state goals 





 5. See Robbie Orvis, The state of US wholesale power markets: Is reliability at risk from low 
prices?, UTILITYDIVE (May 22, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-state-of-us-wholesale-
power-markets-is-reliability-at-risk-from-low-pr/443273/ [https://perma.cc/P99G-XBR7]. 
 6. See infra note 126; see also infra note 146. 
 7. Id. 
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I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE 
POWER MARKETS 
A.  THE GROWTH OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY AND REGULATION 
The electric utility industry began to form in the late nineteenth 
century when Thomas Edison established a utility business in New York 
City’s financial district in 1882, consisting “of steam engines, generators, 
and a wiring network designed to illuminate electric lights in restaurants 
and shops.”8  With the invention of alternating current in the 1880s, which 
could overcome physical limits of “long-distance transmission and 
distribution of power,” utility companies were able to grow “into giant, 
centralized electric power corporations–corporations that quickly became 
classed with railroad companies as both public necessities and public 
demons.”9 
It was not long before there were opportunities in the electricity sector 
for capitalizing on investments in technology risk.  With the invention of 
the steam turbine in 1884 in England, Samuel Insull, secretary to Edison 
for eleven years, became president of Chicago Edison Company in 1892 
and quickly gained advantage over rival Chicago power companies.10  
Using cost-effective turbine generators at 5000-kilowatt (kW) capacity, 
Insull grew his customer base, bought rival firms, and employed various 
business practices to dominate the market.11  This consolidation of market 
power was contrary to the first visions of the electricity market as a freely 
operating exchange of competitive firms that were expected to “ensure 
good service and reasonable prices.”12  Among other issues, market power 
intertwined with local politics soon led to corruption and adoption of other 
models such as municipalization, in which city governments owned and 
operated electric utility assets.13  Indeed, by the 1930s, “[p]ower companies 
remained the only source of political support.  Regulators [at the state 
level] therefore did little to offend their masters.”14  In the absence of 
federal regulation over utility operations and transfers of electricity, state 
commissions were often composed of incompetent professionals 
 
 8. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12 (The MIT Press, 1999); see also id. at 13 (General 
Electric Company was formed in 1892). 
 9. Hirsh, supra note 8, at 13. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1314 (“After installing a 5-MW unit in 1905, Insull’s Commonwealth Edison purchased 
12-MW machines in 1911”); id. at 46. 
 12. Id. at 14. 
 13. Id. at 14 (“Insull, for example, regularly dealt with dishonest Chicago politicians who tried to 
extort huge payments in return for maintaining his monopoly.”). 
 14. Id. at 45. 
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“interested in obtaining a steady job for at least the next six years.”15 
Regulations soon formed to oversee utility operations, since the rise of 
holding companies and the inherent monopolistic nature of the electrical 
system resulted in consolidated market power over customer bases.16  
Utilities controlled the transmission and distribution systems in each 
market and provided services at costs far below that of competitors, which 
prevented other utilities from entering and providing electricity service to 
their customers.17  This control over customer bases and ability to collect 
increasing revenues arguably allowed utility companies to attract the 
capital necessary to match the growing infrastructure needs in the sector, 
since the cost of utility construction rose from $500 million in 1902 to 
more than $2 billion in 1912.18  The theory of natural monopoly that 
allowed such growth held that monopolistic utilities avoided duplicate 
construction and operation of electricity service infrastructure such as 
transmission lines and distribution facilities, which “contributed to 
society’s welfare” since it reduced resource waste.19  With the passage of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935, regulations 
impacting market power and investment in the electric industry began to 
take form, attempting to break apart large utility companies engaging in 
anti-competitive practices and heavy advertising campaigns aimed at 
maintaining their monopoly status.20 
The Federal Power Act (FPA), adopted in 1935, was intended to 
address the regulatory gap (known as the “Attleboro Gap”) in the 
regulation of interstate electricity transfers, authority not held by the 
states.21  Congress established FERC and gave it authority over the 
increased transfers of interstate electricity services occurring in the early 
twentieth century.22 
 
 15. Id. at 43. 
 16. Everest Schmidt, A Call for Federalism: The Role of State Government in Federally 
Controlled Energy Markets, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 578 (2016). 
 17. Id. at 576 n.11 (discussing a natural monopoly in the context of electricity utilities). 
 18. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 34 (“Already in 1910, the industry had become among the most 
capital intensive in the country, requiring five dollars of investment to earn one dollar in annual 
income”). 
 19. Hirsh, supra note 8, at 124. 
 20. Id. at 40 (“The [Federal Trade] Commission reported in 1934 that utility advertising 
campaigns, costing as much as $30 million per year, were second in magnitude only to government 
propaganda efforts during wartime”). 
 21. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927) (holding that 
states cannot regulate interstate electricity transfer since it is an “imposition of a direct burden upon 
interstate commerce, from which the state is restrained by the force of the commerce clause”); see also 
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953) (holding that the Federal Power Act 
“was intended to ‘fill the gap’ . . . left by Attleboro in utility regulation.”). 
 22. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation 
in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 822 (2016). 
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Section 201 of the FPA provides that the federal government has 
authority over “that part of such business which consists of the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” and its power will “extend 
only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”23  
This section explicitly grants states jurisdiction over “facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy,” such as nuclear energy facilities and natural 
gas-fired power plants.24  Section 205 of the FPA states that “[a]ll rates and 
charges made . . . by any public utility for or in connection with the 
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such 
rates or charges shall be just and reasonable . . . .”25  Lastly, Section 206 
allows the Commission to intervene and remedy rates or regulations that it 
finds to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential . . . 
.”26  Arguably, “one of the intentions of the FPA was to draw a bright line 
distinguishing state and federal jurisdiction.”27  However, as this discussion 
of state nuclear energy subsidies will show, defining a bright line can be 
difficult and troubling for both state and federal regulators accomplishing 
conflicting goals. 
Until the 1980s, FERC regulated the wholesale electricity markets by 
reviewing negotiated contracts “based on cost-of-service” principles.28  
Following the conclusion of World War II, electric utility companies 
enjoyed the advantages of vertical integration of their firms, successfully 
exploiting the “grow-and-build strategy” to meet the constant growth that 
occurred for most of the middle-twentieth century.29  Vertically-integrated 
utilities, “owning generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure 
 . . . rarely needed to purchase wholesale electricity,” leaving few 
opportunities for federal intervention in wholesale energy transactions.30 
 
 23. Federal Power Act of 1935 § 201, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2015). 
 24. Federal Power Act of 1935 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d). 
 26. 16 U.S.C. §824(e). 
 27. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 583. 
 28. Ari Peskoe, Integrating Markets and Public Policy in New England Wholesale Electricity 
Markets: Legal Analysis, Harvard Law School, Discussion Draft, at 5, (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/IMAPP-Memo-Harvard-Environmen 
tal-Policy-Initiative-10-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4LP-Q5E5] (rather than filing approval for 
contracts based on costs, sellers requested the ability to sell energy at market-based rates). 
 29. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 55; see also Schmidt, supra note 16, at 583. 
 30. Giovanni S. Saarman Gonzalez, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: 
Promoting Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422, 1432 (2016). 
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B. THE RISE OF REGULATIONS ENCOURAGING COMPETITION AND 
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
During the 1970s, advancements in energy technologies began 
reaching barriers in operational efficiency improvements during a time of 
political turmoil that separately resulted in oil and gas shortages, ultimately 
called “the Energy Crisis” of the 1970s.31  It “highlighted the wasteful ways 
by which Americans produced and consumed energy . . . caused major 
shifts in customers’ behavior and spurred legislation that altered the way 
utilities did business.”32  Indeed, “these developments resulted in much 
greater scrutiny and criticism of the traditional approach to regulating 
utilities and setting electricity rates.”33  The series of federal legislative 
enactments and FERC Orders following the Energy Crisis were aimed 
largely at promoting competition in wholesale electricity markets to 
encourage energy efficiency, innovation, and technological advancement, 
while introducing considerations of environmental impacts from economic 
activities.   
One of the most important pieces of legislation impacting energy 
markets, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), notably 
Section 210, was passed in 1978.34  Addressing energy efficiency at the 
energy generation source, PURPA intended to incentivize more efficient 
electricity generation through unconventional sources, including 
cogeneration technology.35  In a challenge to the traditional, vertically-
integrated utility which controlled much of its energy generation supply for 
most of the twentieth century, “[c]ogenerator entrepreneurs . . . employed 
modular, small-scale technology (such as gas turbines),” and in the 1990s, 
“they found they could beat utility costs by a margin of 5 to 15 percent.”36  
In converting fuel to electricity, technology such as combined-cycle 
cogeneration was able to achieve an efficiency of 50 percent or better, well 
above the range of traditional utility power plants at 35 percent to 40 
percent.37  Cogenerators and other independent power producers were able 
to provide electricity at lower costs by developing smaller-scale power 
plants that operated with more efficient and cost-effective technology as 
compared to larger, traditional utility power plants that were providing 
most of the electricity generation prior to PURPA.38 
 
 31. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 59. 
 32. Id. at 58. 
 33. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 830. 
 34. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3) (2000). 
 35. See Hirsh, supra note 8, at 81. 
 36. Id. at 123. 
 37. Id. at 124. 
 38. Id. 
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Some states adopted bidding schemes for markets to balance energy 
supply and demand, with independent energy suppliers and utilities 
participating to find efficient market outcomes.39  The principle was this: 
“By encouraging bids from nonutility generators, power companies would 
only purchase the amount of electricity they needed. Competition among 
independent producers . . . would establish the effective avoided cost, thus 
leading to lower prices for utilities and their customers.”40  For example, in 
1986, Virginia Power, a utility company, sought to procure 1000 MW of 
future energy reserves for meeting its customer demand in 1990 through an 
energy auction in which it received electricity generation bids (i.e. offers to 
provide future energy capacity) exceeding 5000 MW capacity in total.  
From this multitude of offers, it selected seven different independent 
energy producers totaling 1178 MW to provide the needed capacity.41  The 
influx of energy producers providing offers allowed the bidding mechanism 
to succeed in areas that adopted this system.42 
PURPA “required utilities to purchase or sell electricity from non-
utility owned cogeneration facilities and small power generators,” which 
were known as qualifying facilities at 80-MW or less, at the rate equal to 
their own cost of service and not the prevailing market rate for energy, 
which was significantly lower.43  Instead of purchasing electricity from 
their own vertically-integrated power supply, PURPA required utilities to 
purchase power generated from these smaller, more efficient power plants.  
However, utilities, still owning most of the energy infrastructure needed to 
transfer the power being produced from these independent generators (e.g., 
transmission and distribution systems), were opposed to the growth of 
independent power producers whose electricity they now had to “wheel” 
across their system.44  With regard to any unfairness resulting from this 
imbalance of power, FERC, interpreting provisions of the FPA, “concluded 
that rates that are freely negotiated by sophisticated market participants 
would meet § 205’s just and reasonable standard” and that the two parties 
would negotiate acceptable terms and conditions for their transactions.45 
To address these barriers to economic competition, such as higher 
costs charged by utilities for transmission for non-utility owned electricity, 
 
 39. Id. at 126. 
 40. Id. (providing discussion of avoided cost and bidding principles under PURPA). 
 41. Id. (often, these contracts to provide power were negotiated at attractive prices that pleased 
power purchasers). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 585; see also What is a Qualifying Facility?, FEDERAL ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp 
[https://perma.cc/RK9G-64VQ]. 
 44. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 587. 
 45. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 5. 
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Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), which 
“exempted firms that exclusively sold energy at wholesale from the 
PUHCA ownership restrictions” established at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.46  EPAct 1992 also “strengthened FERC’s authority to 
increase access to transmission services” by allowing third parties to access 
these services.47  FERC accomplished this Congressional mandate by 
passing Order 888 in 1996, which “prohibited owners and operators of 
monopoly transmission facilities from denying transmission access, or 
offering only inferior access, to other power suppliers in order to favor the 
monopolists’ own generation and increase monopoly profits.”48  This meant 
that traditional utilities were required to share their infrastructure, such as 
transmission and distribution infrastructure, with competing independent 
power producers and treat them on fair and reasonable terms when 
charging them for access to their infrastructure. 
FERC soon passed Order 2000 after concluding that in order to fully 
promote competition in the existing marketplace, it needed to establish 
standards for optional development of Regional Transmission Operators 
(RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs).49  These organizations 
took over management of the electricity grid, ensuring regional competitive 
markets were operating successfully within FERC’s guidelines.50  
RTOs/ISOs qualify as public utilities that fall under the jurisdiction of 
FERC, and under Section 205, FERC has authority to review tariff 
amendments and procedures set by these “supervisory” organizations.51  
However, “FERC plays ‘an essentially passive and reactive’ role under § 
205” in reviewing rates that are just and reasonable.52  These non-profit 
organizations whose boards could be composed of representatives from 
different states now control and operate most transmission lines.53  FERC 
encouraged but did not require these regional markets, and although this 
allowed “a new class of independent power producers or merchant 
generators” to enter and compete with the existing utility companies, not all 
states adopted the RTO/ISO model.54 
Today, three regulatory models of electricity dominate the United 
States: (1) the traditional cost-of-service model; (2) the fully-restructured 
 
 46. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 588. 
 47. See Gonzalez, supra note 30, at 1436. 
 48. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 588, quoting FERC Order No. 888, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274-01 
(Mar. 14, 1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
49.  See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 5, quoting FERC Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. at 7, citing Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (2002). 
 53. See Gonzalez, supra note 30, at 1437. 
 54. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 831. 
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model; and (3) a hybrid model combining RTO/ISO management with 
regulated, monopoly retail services provided to investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs).55  New York and Illinois operate under the fully-restructured 
model, which “combines competitive wholesale power markets with retail 
choice in the provision of electricity service,” with wholesale power 
markets and bulk transmission administered by RTOs/ISOs that ensure 
real-time and future energy demands are met.56  Retail electricity providers 
(REPs) (e.g., those who buy power and sell to individual customers, similar 
to Virginia Power discussed above) purchase power in wholesale markets 
through long-term power purchase agreements with independent power 
producers, who aim to generate low-cost electricity for purchase by these 
REPs in regional markets.57  These REPs, aiming to keep the price of their 
electricity service low, must then compete in the marketplace for individual 
consumers, unlike traditional or hybrid regulatory models that grant 
regulated monopoly retail territories to electricity providers.58 
In a traditionally-regulated state, state commissions regulate mostly 
vertically-integrated utilities through the cost-of-service principles 
established through the 1980s, which allow utilities and state commissions 
to collaborate in rate-setting proceedings to establish appropriate electricity 
prices that these companies can charge customers.59  Utilities in these states 
do not participate in regional wholesale energy markets to purchase the 
electricity necessary for their customer bases.  
In restructured states, REPs participate in wholesale power markets, 
and state commissions develop rules regarding collateral matters, such as 
qualifications for an energy provider selling to an in-state REP, rather than 
reviewing and approving prices in the wholesale power markets; the rules 
for which are mostly independent from state intervention.60  Therefore, 
utilities providing electricity to individual customers in traditional states 
purchase power from REPs who control their own supply chain, while 
restructured states allow REPs to participate and purchase power from 
wholesale markets at prevailing market rates. 
Restructured states initially saw higher rates for customers in their 
regions than traditionally-regulated states, but by 1998, the gap between 
them narrowed, and restructured states’ rates more closely  followed gas 
prices, implying that impacts on prices for consumers were a result of 
 
 55. Id. at 834. 
 56. Id. at 837. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 837. 
 59. Id. at 827 (a rate case involved presenting evidence of capital investments in utility assets and 
establishing a fair rate of return sufficient to finance investments in these assets). 
 60. Id. at 836–38. 
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market fluctuations in the price of natural gas, an increasingly common fuel 
input source for independent power generation.61  The vision of a 
competitive marketplace under restructured states is becoming reality, since 
“[i]n 1997 only 1.6% of U.S. electricity was produced by generation owned 
by firms classified as Independent Power Producers.  That figure rose to 
25% by 2002 and was just under 35% in 2012.”62 
RTO/ISO management of nuclear energy generation in the New York 
and Illinois regions is critical, since state policies substantially influence  
the participants in wholesale power markets.  In these regions, there is also 
a substantial number of nuclear plants, which typically serve as a large, 
inflexible source of power that could potentially cause curtailment, or 
prohibit entry altogether, of less expensive sources of energy such as wind 
or solar power.  Nuclear power is important as a base load electricity 
source that provides reliability and stability for the electricity grid.   
The Energy Information Institute (EIA) defines base load power plants 
as plants that are required to provide all or part of the minimum electricity 
load (i.e., demand) and that operate continuously, maximizing system 
mechanical and thermal efficiency and minimizing system operating 
costs.63  Providing the minimum load for various electricity grid regions 
can help ensure electricity system reliability, and continuous operation 
helps reduce shutdown and startup costs as well as achieve various other 
efficiencies.  Traditionally, coal and nuclear plants provided most of the 
base load power for utilities, and renewable energy sources such as wind 
and solar were considered intermittent energy sources.64   
However, the focus of state regulators and RTO/ISO administrators 
recently has been on flexibility and variability rather than continuous base 
load output, advantages which wind and solar energy combined with other 
technologies such as energy storage can provide.65  State efforts to 
encourage specific types of energy generation has created conflicts between 
efforts to ensure local grid reliability and promote clean energy with federal 
goals of ensuring regional competition and technological advancement 
through incentivizing innovation.  FERC Order 1000 “requires 
transmission owners to develop regional plans that consider transmission 
 
 61. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of 
Restructuring, 7 ANNU. REV. ECON. 17-18 (2015). 
 62. Id. at 67. 
 63. Glossary – “B”, ENERGY INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary 
/index.php?id=B [https://perma.cc/6X5S-FFF9]. 
 64. Clint Wilder, Baseload v. Flexibility: Standing the Traditional Generation Model on its Head, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/ 
2016/10/baseload-vs-flexibility-standing-the-traditional-generation-model-on-its-head.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2Y4-BCGA]. 
 65. Id. 
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needs driven by public policy, including states’ renewable mandates,” since 
these policies can “‘directly affect the need for interstate transmission 
facilities, which is squarely within [FERC]’s jurisdiction.’”66  However, 
FERC cautioned against broad exercise of RTO/ISO authority (and 
ultimately FERC authority) over considering state policies in planning.67  
As discussed below, FERC has approved numerous state policy programs 
that substantially impact wholesale power markets by selectively 
encouraging investment in particular energy generation sources or 
increasing regulations to economically burden carbon-emitting sources. 
II.  NUCLEAR ENERGY AND STATE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 
A.  NUCLEAR ENERGY HISTORY, INTERACTION WITH ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS, AND CURRENT TRENDS 
One of the most challenging endeavors for the United States 
government and other developed nations this century  is reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions from the energy generation sector, while having a 
reliable energy supply that can support economic growth.68 Nuclear energy 
technology can deliver large capacities of power with zero emissions 
during the electricity generation process and has “provided almost 20% of 
electrical generation in the United States for over the past two decades.”69  
In 2016, electricity generation from nuclear sources resulted in a reduction 
of 553.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.70  However, drawbacks for 
nuclear power include long construction times and high costs that may be 
difficult to predict.71 
 
 66. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 14, citing FERC Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at para. 
111 (2011). 
 67. Id.; see also, S.C. Pub. Serv. Authority v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding 
that Order 1000 merely establishes a process by which utilities are first to consider whether the policies 
may affect the wholesale market prior to any determinations by FERC). 
 68. Phungmayo Horam, Climate change challenges post-U.S. exit from Paris Climate Agreement, 
BEAM MAGAZINE (July 25, 2017), https://medium.com/thebeammagazine/climate-change-challenges-
post-u-s-exit-from-paris-climate-agreement-f1dcf9391bdb [https://perma.cc/V9UX-NQD8]. 
 69. Nuclear Reactor Technologies, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, 
https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies [https://perma.cc/T6VG-SLQP]); see also U.S. 
Capacity Factors by Fuel Type, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/Knowledge-
Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-Capacity-Factors-by-Fuel-Type [https://perma. 
cc/97C6-GB3G] (noting that in 2015, nuclear energy generation in the United States averaged a 
capacity factor of 92.2%, meaning that nuclear energy technology is significantly more efficient at 
achieving fuel conversion and output). 
 70.  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Emissions Avoided by U.S. Nuclear Industry, 
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/emissions-avoided-by-us-nuc 
ear-industry [https://perma.cc/923M-AE3K];  U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Electricity 
Generation Fuel Shares, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/us-
electricity-generation-fuel-shares-1949-2016 [https://perma.cc/QR68-BHRM].  
 71. DECONSTRUCTING ENERGY LAW AND POLICY: THE CASE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 16 (Raphael J. 
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Nuclear power emerged as a source of electricity generation after 
World War II, and researchers in 1980 found that the “prospects for nuclear 
energy depend on a variety of factors: the success of energy conservation, 
the long-term competitiveness of nuclear energy, the growth of coal 
production,” and the risk of future accidents and regulatory environments.72  
With regard to competition, “nuclear energy in the US has significant 
competition as an electricity supply source, not just from coal and gas, but 
increasingly from renewable energy.”73  Arguably, the fragmentation of the 
United States electricity markets in the latter part of the twentieth century 
caused financial difficulties for nuclear energy companies who often 
designed plans for large scale electricity supply projects and dealt with 
multiple regional electricity markets and regulations.74  Large-scale 
projects often require guarantees of revenue returns in the form of power 
purchase agreements before companies can raise necessary capital for 
construction, and competition has introduced uncertainty in receiving 
revenues and cost recovery.75  Regarding subsidies, states have a significant 
role in the development of new nuclear plants.  However, the deregulation 
of electricity markets (i.e., establishment of regional competitive markets) 
creates “a conflict with considerable tension between states’ attempts to 
manage their economies, environments and financial resources.”76 
The nuclear sector has seen a lack of commitments from the federal 
government over the last two decades as far as financial incentives and 
support.77  Most importantly, inaction on a carbon market or carbon tax, 
which would provide financial rewards to carbon-free electricity generation 
sources such as nuclear energy through market mechanisms, has failed to 
give nuclear energy a cost advantage regarding its non-CO2-producing 
electricity production.78  Indeed, “[t]he costs associated with carbon 
dioxide emissions are generally not reflected in electricity market prices.”79  
In 2013, nuclear received approximately $1.7 billion in energy-specific 
 
Heffron ed., Edinburgh University Press, 2015); see also id. at 28 (noting that “the US Federal 
government has been slow . . . to resolve and fund research” in nuclear waste management). 
 72. Id. at 1; see also id. at 19 (In 2016, nuclear energy faced competition from energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, the declining cost of energy due to an influx of natural gas in wholesale energy 
markets, and public opposition due to domestic and international accidents.). 
 73. Id. at 64. 
 74. Id. at 65. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 72. 
 77. Id. at 99. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, Carbon Pricing in New York ISO Markets: Federal and 
State Issues, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 26 (Feb. 2017), http://colum 
biaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/02/Gundlach-Webb-2017-02-Carbon-Pricing-in-NYISO-Markets.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8E2M-L78A] (discussing societal costs of carbon dioxide emissions as economic 
externalities from a lack of price on carbon and a resulting market failure). 
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subsidies, while natural gas received $2.3 billion and renewables received 
over $15 billion.80  Nonetheless, “[t]he share of nuclear generation owned 
by [independent power producers] rose from zero in 1997 to almost 50% in 
2012, as utilities sold off their nuclear assets.”81  Capital expenditures in the 
industry peaked in 2012 at $9.02 billion but have since steadily decreased, 
and in 2017 capital spending totaled $5.34 billion.82  Total generating costs, 
which include capital, fuel, and operating costs, also decreased by 19 
percent since 2012 due to decreases in capital expenditures, fuel, and 
operations costs.83 
Under President Donald Trump, the nuclear industry has already seen 
proposals to support its survival and is hoping that the federal government 
will intervene more than the Obama administration and save an ailing 
industry.84  The current energy supply mix is changing, and nuclear plants 
that traditionally received preferable regulatory treatment with regard to 
cost recovery are now facing challenges from natural gas, which will likely 
continue to make nuclear plant construction or operation uneconomical 
given its low prices.85  Indeed, former Chief Executive Officer of Exelon 
Corporation, the largest producer of nuclear power, noted that “[a]s long as 
natural gas is anywhere near current price forecasts, you can’t 
economically build a merchant nuclear plant.”86  Since 2013, six nuclear 
reactors . . . have shut down permanently, and several energy companies 
have announced plans to close six additional plants throughout the U.S 
between 2019 and 2025.87 
When nuclear plants close, they often have disproportionate impacts 
on the towns they operate in, as well as nearby regions.  For example, the 
Vermont Yankee nuclear plant closure, due to competitive market 
pressures, had devastating economic impacts on the town of Vernon, 
 
 80. Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Fiscal Year 2013 (Table ES2. 
Quantified energy-specific subsidies and support by type, FY 2010 and FY 2013), U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/ [https://perma. 
cc/RX72-JSBV]. 
 81. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 61, at 7. 
 82. Nuclear Costs in Context, at 2-3, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (Aug. 2017), https:// 
www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/reports-and-briefs/nuclear-costs-context-2018 
10.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X9JS-YCYL] 
 83. Id. 
 84. Jonathan Crawford, Trump and U.S. Nuclear Power Find Ground in Jobs Push, BLOOMBERG, 
(Feb. 7, 2017 10:03 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/trump-and-u-s-nucle 
ar-power-find-common-ground-in-jobs-push [https://perma.cc/3YTM-BTW3]. 
 85. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 22, at 849 (“these new reactors would never be built in states 
operating in hybrid and restructured markets”). 
 86. Id. citing Mark Clayton, Nuclear Power a Viable Competitor in US Energy Market, Study 
Finds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 17, 2010) (quoting John Rowe, Exelon CEO), http://www. 
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0917/Nuclear-power-a-viable-competitor-in-US-energy-market-study-finds 
[http://perma.cc/WU25-V66G]. 
 87. See supra note 82, at 5. 
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Vermont.88  The plant had a payroll of $66 million and impacts on local 
suppliers and businesses totaled approximately $500 million.89  Vernon lost 
half of its tax base with the plant closure, severely impacting funding for a 
library, town hall, recreation center, and elementary school, as well as its 
$2 million emergency fund.90  
Marketplace risk for nuclear power is evident with the issues 
discussed in this paper, resulting from dropping costs of energy production 
and lower revenues for independent power producers.  This risk places 
economic burdens on companies attempting to engage in long-term power 
purchase agreements, often at fixed prices for the duration of the contract.  
Recent trends reflect the rise of competitive energy firms as well as new 
technological and market risks, familiar trends that began with Edison and 
Insull in New York and Illinois in the beginning of the twentieth century. 
B.  OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL ENERGY MARKETS AND STATE PROGRAMS 
FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 
New York operates its electricity marketplace for transmission and 
wholesale electricity under the supervision of an ISO, the New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO).91  NYISO manages the energy 
markets that allocate real-time energy delivery, ancillary services (e.g., grid 
maintenance), and capacity (e.g. future energy reserves).92  Because 
NYISO oversees an electricity grid that is physically connected throughout 
the eastern United States, and involves energy and service transactions 
across multiple states, it is subject to FERC authority.93  This means that 
NYISO must notify FERC and submit filings before modifying rates or 
rules and regulations pertaining to rates.94  FERC has approved market-
based rates on the theory that they are “just and reasonable” since the 
market is designed to prohibit entities from holding market power, thus 
freely negotiated contracts do not violate the standard.95 
Illinois operates in two regional marketplaces, the Midcontinent 
 
 88. Saqib Rahim, When a town loses its economic center, E&E NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060064251[ https://perma.cc/WR7E-JG8N]. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 10. 
 92. Id. at 12. 
 93. Id. at 15. 
 94. Id. at 2021 (“FERC’s review is intended to ensure that the rates and practices set out [by 
NYISO] are just and reasonable”); see also id. citing Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Pub. Util. 
Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008) (holding that the just and reasonable standard is “incapable of 
precise judicial definition”). 
 95. Id. at 22 (“FERC requires the seller to demonstrate that it lacks or has adequately mitigated 
market power . . . FERC monitors sellers’ activities in the market to ensure that they do not re-attain 
market power”). 
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Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO) and the PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C. (PJM), an RTO.96  Both MISO and PJM conduct wholesale auctions 
that include independent power producers and other market participants 
that provide ancillary energy services.  Similar to NYISO, both MISO and 
PJM are subject to FERC authority and stem from the ability of states and 
utilities to implement RTO/ISO management of the electricity grid and 
wholesale energy markets under FERC Order 2000.  All three marketplaces 
use wholesale auction bidding by accepting bids from generators at 
increasing prices, beginning with the lowest-priced bid, until the 
instantaneous or future demand is met.  Each bidding location utilizes 
locational-based marginal pricing (LMP), a mechanism by which prices 
reflect local demand and supply conditions as well as transmission 
constraints that may exist when moving electricity across the grid to meet 
demand.97  Market participants propose bids at prices that are economically 
efficient for them, thus when bids are accepted, these firms receive 
revenues above their expected marginal costs.  When the bid price rises too 
high, market participants demanding higher prices than the market clearing 
price are excluded.  In effect, these prices signal to market participants 
when to bid into regional energy market auctions. 
In a simple example, an RTO/ISO determines that the demand for a 
particular zone in its region is 10,000 MW, and it will run an auction to 
allow procurement of enough energy to meet this amount with the goal of 
establishing a market clearing price.98  A 6000 MW nuclear plant is often 
forced to bid at a low price in order to ensure its capacity enters the market 
to avoid increased operational costs from shutdown and startup.99  It will 
bid 6000 MW for $1 per MW-year. The next lowest-cost bidder, bidder 2, 
an efficient power plant, offers 3000 MW at $5000 per MW-year.  The 
third bidder, a less efficient power plant, offers 1000 MW at $15,000 per 
MW-year.  The offers from these three bidders totals the 10,000 MW in 
demand needed for the zone.  A fourth bidder, offering 1000 MW at 
$20,000 per MW-year, is excluded from the market since bidder 3 is 
offering a lower price per MW-year.  The market clearing price in this 
 
 96. About MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/9HHF-9GHG]; see also 
PJM, http://www.pjm.com/ [https://perma.cc/3H8L-HRCX]. 
 97. Mathangi Srinivasan, Locational Based Marginal Pricing, New York Market Orientation 
Course, NYISO (Oct. 17, 2018), http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/services/ 
market_training/workshops_courses/Training_Course_Materials/NYMOC_MT_ALL_201/Locational_
Based_Marginal_Pricing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WX3-HSD6]; see also PJM Learning Center, 
Locational Marginal Pricing, https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/lmp.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GP8E-3ZZH]. 
 98. Robin Deliso Woodcock, Your Definitive Guide to (PJM) Capacity Auctions, ENERGYSMART 
BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.energysmart.enernoc.com/your-definitive-guide-pjm-capacity-auctio 
ns [https://perma.cc/9K7Q-94MQ]. 
 99. Id. 
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example is $15,000 per MW-year, as established by the third bidder, and 
this amount is paid for each MW-year provided by the three bidders.  The 
nuclear plant, although bidding at $1 per MW-year, also receives $15,000 
per MW-year for the 6000 MW it provides.  However, this amount may 
nonetheless be below the actual cost of providing the 6000 MW in 
capacity, and the nuclear plant may be forced to operate at a loss due to 
prevailing market clearing prices.  Each ISO/RTO is responsible for 
determining the region’s’ real-time energy demands and capacity in order 
to administer the auctions effectively.100 
The New York Public Service Commission recently adopted a Clean 
Energy Standard (CES) that potentially interferes with FERC’s wholesale 
market authority by subsidizing certain market participants’ bidding in 
regional markets.101  The CES utilizes the social cost of carbon, a figure 
determined to represent the dollar amount to society of avoided long-term 
damage done by every ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere, 
to value carbon-free electricity generation and establish the zero emission 
credit (ZEC) representing this value.102  The state will provide $965 million 
over two years to three nuclear plants that were struggling to compete in 
regional markets due to the low price of natural gas.103  In considering the 
market structure of NYISO, these nuclear plants had failed to successfully 
compete in the market and were unable to secure revenues above their 
costs, facing bankruptcy.104  The CES requires that LSEs procure ZECs 
from the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority.105  
With this procurement mandate serving effectively as a subsidy payment to 
ZEC producers (i.e. nuclear plants), ZECs essentially serve to lower the 
cost faced by these electricity generators, allowing them to reenter the 
market at artificially low bidding prices.  This is contrary to free market 
principles envisioned by FERC, which aim to reward cost-effective, 
innovative market participants that strive to achieve the lowest marginal 
costs of service in providing electricity to consumers. 
 
 100. See generally, View Point – Capacity Markets: Enabling PJM to obtain sufficient resources to 
reliably meet the needs of electric consumers, PJM (2016) http://www.pjm.com/~/media/about-pjm/ 
newsroom/fact-sheets/20161019-view-point-capacity-markets.ashx [https://perma.cc/BR2P-2VXP]. 
 101. Robert Walton, Updated: New York PSC approves 50% clean energy standard, nuclear 
subsidies, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-new-york-psc-appr 
oves-50-clean-energy-standard-nuclear-subsidies/423635/ [https://perma.cc/2SXF-L6W5]. 
 102. See generally The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY https:// 
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html [https://perma.cc/9DR9-9X7M]. 
 103. Robert Walton, What the Hughes v. Talen Supreme Court decision means for state power 
incentives, UTILITYDIVE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-hughes-v-talen-
supreme-court-decision-means-for-state-power-incen/418046/ [https://perma.cc/J96D-SZKY]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Clean Energy Standard, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Ener 
gy-Standard [https://perma.cc/E96L-FAZ8].  
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Similarly, later in 2016, Illinois passed the Future Energy Jobs Act, 
which also made amendments to the Illinois Power Agency Act in 
establishing a ZEC program.106  Arguably, legislators handed out $2.4 
billion in subsidies to two nuclear plants that were no longer economical to 
operate over ten years, citing environmental benefits of zero emission 
energy generation technology and economic interests.107  The two plants 
lost a combined $100 million per year because competing energy 
generation sources, such as natural gas and wind energy, caused lower 
market clearing prices and revenues for market participants.108  
Among other changes to state renewable energy and energy efficiency 
policies, FEJA establishes a zero emission standard that will support these 
at risk nuclear facilities by directing development of “plans and processes 
for the procurement of zero emission credits from zero emission facilities,” 
specifically nuclear plants, commencing June 1, 2017.109  The program 
awards ten-year contracts for procurement of ZECs from zero emission 
facilities, and the zero emission credit prices awarded on these procurement 
contracts will be set through a statutory formula which will be set once per 
delivery year.110  The statute incorporates environmental concerns into 
winning bid selection criteria by providing that winning bids shall be 
selected “based on public interest criteria that include, but are not limited 
to, minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity 
consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and 
particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of 
[Illinois].”111 
 
 106. Future Energy Jobs Act, Public Act 099-0906 (12/7/16), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
99/SB/PDF/09900SB2814lv.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV3S-92XT]; see also Benjamin Storrow, 
Midwestern lawmakers green the grid, slightly, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 19, 2016). 
 107. See Storrow, supra note 106; see also Oddball political coalition lauds new energy policy, 
UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 12, 2016) (“Critics said the new law would force utility customers to pay billions of 
dollars to subsidize the two unprofitable nuclear plants owned by a highly profitable corporation.  
Supporters said the legislation would bring a series of long-term benefits by keeping the nuclear plants 
open while increasing investment in renewable power and energy efficiency”). 
 108. James Conca, Illinois Sees the Light – Retains Nuclear Power, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/12/04/illinois-sees-the-light-retains-nuclear-power/#1f 
3324143e7b [https://perma.cc/4FZY-LUG8]. 
 109. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(a) (2017). 
 110. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (2017). 
 111. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C) (2017). 
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III.  INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE ENERGY POLICIES AND FEDERAL 
LAW 
A.  HUGHES AND FERC AUTHORITY OVER WHOLESALE POWER 
MARKETS 
In 2016, in “the most complicated and lowest-profile of recent FERC 
cases to come before the U.S. Supreme Court,” the Court provided some 
guidance regarding the ability of states to alter rules and impact federally-
regulated wholesale energy markets.112  Maryland regulators anticipated 
shortages in electricity supply with coming coal plant retirements and 
decided to incentivize in-state construction of a 650-MW gas-fired plant by 
allowing state load-serving entities (LSEs) (e.g., electric utilities serving 
retail customers) to compensate the difference between a state-stipulated 
contract price and the market clearing price in PJM.113  Essentially, this 
provided market price protection through a “contract for differences” by 
providing payment guarantees to the market participant in case accepted 
bids were below the cost of service.  The Court found that “FERC 
extensively regulates the structure of the PJM capacity auction to ensure 
that it efficiently balances supply and demand, producing a just and 
reasonable clearing price” and concluded that this federal authority 
preempted Maryland’s incentives for in-state energy generation.114 
The Court stressed that this was a narrow decision, focused on one 
gas-fired plant in particular, with identifiable market advantages, and 
“Hughes simply does not speak to how wholesale markets fail to price 
important values, such as environmental concerns and reliability.”115  The 
Court found preemption upon finding that the contract for differences 
disregarded an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.116  
The contract mechanism in Hughes was intended to disregard the 
wholesale market prices resulting from auctioning.  Arguably, if FERC has 
not adopted a regime that prices these attributes in the wholesale market, 
such as setting a federal price on carbon emissions, states are free to adopt 
initiatives that do not intrude wholesale rate authority, such as the CES 
ZEC payments or FEJA’s zero emission standard.117 
New York and Illinois have attempted to price carbon emissions 
within their states and award certain generators of zero emission electricity 
directly using similar out-of-market prices, actions that arguably impact 
 
 112. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016); see also Walton, supra note 103. 
 113. See Walton, supra note 103. 
 114. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294–97. 
 115. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 448-49 (2016). 
 116. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 117. Id. 
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market wholesale rates and ultimately FERC authority.  Indeed, “Congress 
was likely unaware of the full range of challenges that would be presented 
to modern energy markets . . . .”118  As discussed below, federal district 
courts in New York and Illinois have provided recent guidance in 
interpreting the FPA and Hughes in considering the permissibility of state 
policies that can potentially impact federal energy markets. 
The dormant Commerce Clause can limit the scope and impact of state 
programs aimed to incentivize generation and analyzes whether the “state 
statute discriminates against out-of-state businesses or whether it treats 
both in-state and out-of-state businesses alike.”119  Facially discriminatory 
laws against interstate commerce are unconstitutional, while facially 
neutral laws are examined further for discriminatory effects through 
analysis of their impacts on interstate commerce.120  Lastly, if the law is 
found to be discriminatory, then it will only be upheld “so as long as its 
benefit outweighs its burden on interstate commerce.”121  Given the 
intricate nature of the energy system, including the complexity of market 
transactions and uncertainty about future outcomes, it can be difficult to 
assess impacts on interstate commerce.  However, “courts have applied 
strict scrutiny to state laws that were enacted simply to promote job 
creation or economic development, if by doing so, they unduly burden 
interstate commerce.”122 
Plaintiffs who bring dormant Commerce Clause claims must have 
standing, which requires that plaintiffs have “an ‘injury in fact’” and that 
the injury be “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant.123  
Thus, if the injuries are “not traceable to discrimination against the 
commerce of other states,” then plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a 
dormant Commerce Clause claim.124  Specifically, the dormant Commerce 
Clause protects the economic interests of out-of-state entities, and 
“[p]laintiffs must ‘allege an injury stemming from the application of the 
[state policy] in a manner discriminatory to out-of-state interests’ . . . 
whether due to facial discrimination against or an undue burden on out-of-
state economic interests.”125 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 618, 620 (“The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the 
power ‘[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States’” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
 120. Id. at 621. 
 121. Id. at 624 (known as the “Pike balancing test” (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970)). 
 122. Id. at 62930 (“Even if the Court characterizes the purpose as promoting local interests, so long 
as the law regulates evenhandedly, it will be characterized as legitimate”). 
 123. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 124. See infra note 145, at 7. 
 125. See supra note 123, at 582. 
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B. CHALLENGES TO THE NEW YORK CES ORDER AND ZEC PROGRAM IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
In New York, a federal court upheld the ZEC program under the CES, 
dismissing challenges from independent power producers who argued that 
the ZEC program intruded federal jurisdiction to regulate rates and tariffs 
in wholesale power markets and violated the Constitution by discriminating 
against out-of-state power plants.126  The opinion begins with identifying 
that climate change is an issue and that “New York and many other States 
have decided that they will do their part to reduce the emissions that 
contribute to global warming.”127  In relying heavily on Hughes, the court 
examines the CES order in detail and concludes that (1) the ZEC program 
is not field preempted under the FPA, (2) is not conflict preempted under 
FERC objectives, (3) and does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 
C. THE ZEC PROGRAM AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Plaintiffs argued that the ZEC program is both field preempted and 
conflict preempted.128  However, the court concluded that the program is 
not “tethered” to wholesale auctions, does not directly affect the wholesale 
prices in these auctions, and does not interfere with FERC’s objective of 
maintaining competitive energy markets.129  “Field preemption exists where 
‘Congress has forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal 
statute pre-empts.’”130  By contrast, conflict preemption “exists where 
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or where the state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”131 
In considering field preemption, the court recognized, citing Hughes, 
that the “FPA is a paragon of cooperative federalism; it divides 
responsibility for the regulation of energy between state and federal 
regulators.”132  Most importantly, the court noted that that where federal 
and state efforts must coordinate within an administrative framework in 
pursuit of common purposes, the court is less likely to find federal 
preemption.133  Here, FERC has substantial authority over wholesale rates 
and rules and has authority to “ensure that rules or practices ‘affecting’ 
 
 126. Coalition for Competitive Electricity, v. Zibelman, 272 F.Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 
2017). 
 127. Id. at 554. 
 128. Id. at 563. 
 129. Id. at 569–77. 
 130. Id. at 567 (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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wholesale rates are just and reasonable.”134  Hughes “left open the 
possibility for States to ‘encourag[e] production of new or clean generation 
through measures untethered to a generator’s wholesale market 
participation.’”135  Plaintiffs claimed that the program is an “impermissible 
tether” because “(1) a nuclear generator is eligible for a ZEC only if the 
NYISO auction rates are insufficient . . . (2) ZEC prices are calculated 
using forecast wholesale rates; and (3) the nuclear generators receiving the 
ZECs sell all of their power directly into the auction markets.”136  The court 
found that (1) there exist many state programs that “involve propping up 
the operation of a generator that might otherwise be unprofitable,” (2) ZEC 
prices are unrelated to the recipient’s market participation, and (3) that the 
“CES Order itself does not require the nuclear generators to sell into the 
NYISO auction.”137  In comparing to Hughes, the court recognized that in 
Hughes “there was a direct and concrete tie (or tether) between the 
contracts-for-difference and the generator’s wholesale market 
participation”138 and that “New York has successfully threaded the needle 
left by Hughes that allows States to adopt innovative programs to 
encourage the production of clean energy.”139 
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s conflict preemption claim, noting 
that “when the State is legitimately regulating a matter of state concern, 
‘FERC’s exercise of its authority must accommodate” that state regulation 
“[u]nless clear damage to federal goals would result.’”140  The ZEC 
program “does not thwart the goal of an efficient energy market; rather, it 
encourages through financial incentives the production of clean energy” 
since it does not guarantee a particular market price for ZEC-eligible 
recipients and does not present “clear damage” required for a finding of 
conflict preemption.141  To hold otherwise, the court importantly noted, 
“would call into question [renewable energy credits] and all state subsidies, 
such as tax incentives and land grants” that also exert “price-distorting 
effects on market signals and allow some generators to clear the auction 
when they otherwise would be priced out.”142 
 
 134. Id. (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016)). 
 135. Id. at 568 (citing Hughes at 1299). 
 136. Id. at 569. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 562. 
 139. Id. at 564. 
 140. Id. at 564 (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansans, 109 S. Ct. 
1262, 522 (1989)). 
 141. Id. at 566. 
 142. Id. 
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D. THE ZEC PROGRAM AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause claims 
since “they do not allege a nexus between their injury and any 
discriminatory aspect of the ZEC program.”143  To violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause, a state law or regulation must “(1) clearly [discriminate] 
against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce, (2) [impose] a 
burden on interstate commerce incommensurate with the local benefits 
secured, or (3) [have] the practical effect of ‘extraterritorial’ control of 
commerce occurring entirely outside the boundaries of the state in 
question.”144  Indeed, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege injury to 
their out-of-state entities arising from discrimination against or an undue 
burden from the ZEC program.145  The court recognized that plaintiffs 
would be similarly burdened if the ZEC program expanded to out-of-state 
nuclear plants (i.e., their power plants would still not receive ZEC 
payments), and therefore, the alleged injury falls outside the “zone of 
interests” protected by the dormant Commerce Clause. 
E. CHALLENGES TO ILLINOIS’ FEJA AND ZEC PAYMENTS IN FEDERAL 
COURT 
Earlier in July, a federal district court in the Northern District of 
Illinois dismissed challenges to Illinois’ FEJA and its ZEC program, where 
consumer plaintiffs and independent power producers (the Electric Power 
Supply Association) had brought similar claims of preemption and dormant 
Commerce Clause violations.146  Plaintiffs argued that the ZEC program is 
preempted by the FPA and FERC authority over wholesale markets and 
alleged that “a state regulation that substantially affects the quantity or 
terms of wholesale sales is preempted.”147  However, the court held that 
“Illinois does not require participation in wholesale auctions in order to 
receive ZECs . . . [nuclear generators] can receive ZECs even if they do not 
participate in the energy auction.”148  Therefore, since the ZEC does not 
require that nuclear generators clear auctions in PJM or MISO, the court 
concluded that “the state . . . is not imposing a condition directly on 
wholesale transactions.”149  In conclusion, the court held that Illinois “has 
sufficiently separated ZECs from wholesale transactions such that the 
[FPA] does not preempt the state program under principles of field 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 567. 
 146. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163, 2017 WL3008289, (N.D. III. July 14, 2017).  
 147. Id. at *11. 
 148. Id. at *13. 
 149. Id. 
ARSHAK CUTTING CARBON FINAL ARTICLE_MCCARTHY ADDS BIO FN%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)12/13/2018  10:37 AM 
Winter 2019 COMPETING TO CUT CARBON 195 
preemption.”150  In dismissing the conflict preemption claim, the court held 
that there had not been “clear damage” to FERC’s goals from the ZEC 
program and that “the interplay between state and federal regulation can 
continue to exist” since “[t]he regulatory structure remains unaltered, and 
FERC’s power undiminished.”151 
Lastly, plaintiffs claimed that the ZEC program fails the Pike 
balancing test and violates the dormant Commerce Clause “because its 
impacts on interstate commerce far outweigh any claimed environmental 
benefits” and since it “distorts the market by driving out and deterring the 
entry of more cost-efficient, environmentally-friendly, out-of-state 
generators.”152  Additionally, plaintiffs pointed to statements of Illinois 
Governor Bruce Rauner stating that FEJA was intended to protect the 
Clinton and Quad Cities plants and related jobs.153  The court held that the 
remarks about potential job-saving attributes of FEJA do not negate the 
state’s legitimate interests in (1) environment and public health and (2) 
creating and regulating a market to encourage a power mix of its 
choosing.154  Lastly, the ZEC program only “indirectly burdens other 
generators’ ability to compete in wholesale auctions,” and thus, the 
dormant Commerce Clause claim fails.155 
F. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCENTIVIZING CLEAN 
ENERGY GENERATION SOURCES 
The integrated nature of wholesale energy markets, involving multiple 
states and regulatory agencies in addition to RTOs/ISOs, requires broader 
planning and policy implementation of climate change initiatives aimed at 
incentivizing carbon-free electricity generation. State policies, by contrast, 
“[d]ue to their partial application . . . provide only incomplete and inchoate 
remedies for the market failure [of carbon pricing] and arguably further 
distort the market, thereby impairing effective competition among 
wholesale buyers and sellers.”156  The FPA gives FERC authority over 
wholesale sales of electricity, and subsequent orders by FERC have 
asserted federal authority over certain aspects of regional wholesale market 
operations.157  PJM and NYISO are exploring options to better integrate 
carbon-pricing within their regions and ensure market efficiency.  
 
 150. Id. at *14. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at *16. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 61 (“any carbon pricing scheme proposed by NYISO 
would have to be integrated with [regional carbon pricing and trading markets]”).“” 
 157. See supra note 23. 
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Additionally, the Department of Energy (DOE) under Secretary Rick Perry 
has responded to industry and political concerns and has proposed new 
market rules to provide compensation to base load power generation plants 
such as coal and nuclear, “outlining what would be the biggest overhaul in 
competitive energy markets since their establishment in the late 1990s.”158  
However, on January 8, 2018, FERC rejected the DOE NOPR and directed 
regional market operators to examine grid resilience issues and submit 
relevant information to FERC to inform future regulatory action in a new 
proceeding.159 
The regional market concept has effectively incentivized investment 
in the renewable energy sector at unprecedented levels, with a recent plan 
from PacifiCorp to invest in a $3.5 billion wind farm in light of “PURPA-
enabled” success in wind and solar.160  Additionally, American Electric 
Power also introduced an investment plan of $1.8 billion into “competitive, 
contracted renewable energy projects.”161  Allowing these ZECs to occur 
and thereby potentially affect wholesale market auctions could introduce 
regulatory uncertainty and impair investment, since “[t]he fact that, at any 
time, regulatory agencies could introduce a subsidy for certain resources 
that would suppress wholesale market prices will very likely eliminate the 
willingness for competitive suppliers to enter the wholesale market.”162 
Indeed, PJM reports that the recently “proposed subsidy solutions in 
all cases ignore the opportunity cost of subsidizing uneconomic units, 
which is the displacement of resources and technologies that would 
otherwise be economic.”163  A recent study found that despite their 
 
 158. Department of Energy, Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 46940, 46941 (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-10-10/pdf/2017-213 
96.pdf; see also Gavin Bade, Updated: DOE proposes cost recovery for baseload generators in new 
FERC rule, UTILITYDIVE (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-doe-proposes-
cost-recovery-for-baseload-generators-in-new-ferc-rul/506137/ [https://perma.cc/JN3G-NHX5]. 
 159. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing 
Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012-01 (2018). 
 160. Jeff St. John, Breaking Down PacifiCorp’s $3.5B Wind Power Investment Plan, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/breaking-down-pacificorps-3.5b-
wind-power-investment-plan [https://perma.cc/YK98-7YU6]; see generally Solar Market Insight 
Report 2016 Year in Review, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/solar-market-insight-report-2016-year-review [https://perma.cc/P8BR-MUXB].. 
 161. Peter Maloney, AEP to invest $1.8B in renewable energy, UTILITYDIVE (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-to-invest-18b-in-renewable-energy/510192/ [https://perma.cc/P5 
4G-ZHVH]. 
 162. Stu Bresler, Potential Alternative Approach to Expanding the Minimum Offer Price Rule to 




 163. State of the Market Report for PJM Volume 2: Detailed Analysis, MONITORING ANALYTICS 
LLC (Mar. 9, 2017), at 2, http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/10/document_pm_06.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/EHB9-GR3P]. 
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imperfections, regional markets lower costs, saving about $3 billion a year 
in electricity generation.164  Distorting market incentives for a period as 
long as ten years could potentially harm regional market structures and 
decrease savings for consumers in the long run. 
Those defending the subsidies claim that they are similar in structure 
and legal validity to renewable energy certificates/credits (RECs) currently 
offered by states and sold in energy marketplaces.165  Both New York and 
Illinois wholesale markets currently include or plan to include RECs.166  
The Environmental Protection Agency defines RECs as a market-based 
instrument that is a representation of environmental and social benefits of 
renewable energy generation.167  When renewable energy generators 
produce electricity, one REC is awarded per MW-hour of electricity 
generated. RECs, through certificate tracking systems, can be sold 
separately or together with the electricity they generate.168  RECs transfer 
the ownership rights of the attributes of renewable electricity generation 
“despite the physical inability to identify the exact generating source” to 
which they are attributed.169  In 2003, FERC issued an order stating that 
RECs are “outside the confines of PURPA” and that a utility purchasing 
electricity from a power generator does not automatically receive 
ownership rights to RECs.170  Lastly, FERC stated that states can adopt 
legislation that regulates and assigns ownership of RECs.171 
In upholding the CES ZEC program and Illinois’ FEJA, federal 
district courts likened ZECs to RECs.172  Most importantly, “FERC has 
disclaimed jurisdiction over RECs . . . when those instruments are sold 
independently of FERC-jurisdictional energy sales.”173  In New York, the 
court concluded that ZEC transactions are separate from wholesale energy 
sales and that “FERC’s acknowledgement that RECs are outside its 
jurisdiction indicates that similar programs . . . distinct from wholesale 
 
 164. Steve Cicla, Imperfect Markets Versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation 
(Jan. 22, 2017) at 40, https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/UofC%20 
Electricity%20Gov%20v%20Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-8WM7]. 
 165. See Walton, supra note 103. 
 166. See generally Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY (last visited Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/renewable-energy-certificates-
recs [https://perma.cc/8DHS-RH27]. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Renewable Electricity: How do you know you are using it? at 1, National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (Aug. 2015), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64558.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZRY-98L9]. 
 169. Todd Jones et al., The Legal Basis for Renewable Energy Certificates, at 7, Center for 
Resource Solutions (June 17, 2015), http://resource-solutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-
Legal-Basis-for-RECs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HQY-CSH8]. 
 170. American Ref-Fuel Company, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,004, 61,007 (2003). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See supra note 125, at *563; see also supra note 145, at *13. 
 173. See Peskoe, supra note 28, at 20. 
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transactions are not preempted.”174  Similarly, in Illinois, the court held that 
“sales of ZECs are unbundled” from wholesale sales and are not 
preempted.175 
Recommendations for Pricing Carbon Dioxide Emissions in NYISO 
In New York, considering a different approach to carbon pricing other 
than subsidies (e.g., mandatory ZEC procurement under the CES), a 
uniform standard for applying prices for avoided carbon dioxide emissions 
could provide more economically efficient outcomes since this mechanism 
would reward other similar socially beneficial energy generators.176  
Similar to the carbon pricing framework by PJM, a recent report prepared 
for NYISO concludes that “a carbon charge would be a straightforward and 
economically efficient way to harmonize New York’s environmental goals 
and the wholesale market design by pricing the environmental externality 
associated with carbon emissions directly.”177  A NYISO regional carbon 
adder could potentially enhance competition aimed at achieving the alleged 
goals of the ZEC (i.e., environmental benefits).178  A carbon adder would 
impose additional costs per ton of carbon dioxide generated, increasing the 
cost of transacting in wholesale markets for carbon-emitting electricity 
generation source.  Although New York already participates in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is a mandatory market-
based emissions trading program, “[h]igher carbon prices [through a 
regional carbon adder] would provide a stronger market signal than current 
RGGI prices and reward efficiency improvements across the fossil fleet, 
incentivize conservation and energy efficiency, encourage storage and 
other technologies that can reduce emissions . . . .”179  The report notes that 
“CES procurement of RECs and ZECs does not invite competition as 
broadly as carbon pricing would since it targets specific resource types and 
amounts dependent on solicitations from [NYSERDA].”180  Alternatively, 
the carbon price approach would require that “carbon-emitting generation 
 . . . pay a uniform price on the amount of carbon they emit for each unit of 
energy they produce, raising their variable energy costs,” thus providing 
carbon-free generation sources an advantage since they would not bear 
 
 174. See supra note 125 at *563. 
 175. See supra note 145 at *13. 
 176. See Gundlach & Webb, supra note 79, at 42-43. 
 177. Samuel A. Newell et al., Pricing Carbon into NYISO’s Wholesale Energy Market to Support 
New York’s Decarbonization Goals, 7, THE BRATTLE GROUP (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.nyiso. 
com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/documents/Studies_and_Reports/Studies/Market_Studies/Pric
ing_Carbon_into_NYISOs_Wholesale_Energy_Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/62YX-QVPR]. 
 178. See Gundlach & Romany Webb, supra note 79 at 48. 
 179. Samuel A. Newell et al., supra note 177 at v. 
 180. Id. at 14. 
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such cost burdens.181  Such a proposal would integrate a uniform price 
signal in these wholesale markets and maintain economic principals aimed 
at incentivizing low-cost, carbon-free generation. 
NYISO can price carbon in one of two ways: (1) apply a price per ton 
of carbon emitted in its energy marketplace or (2) implement a cap-and-
trade scheme by setting a maximum allowable emissions target (i.e., a 
“cap”) and administrating auctions for carbon-generating sources to 
purchase and trade these allowable emissions.182  In the first approach, 
NYISO would add a carbon charge to each carbon-generating source’s 
market transactions based on each generator’s carbon emission rate.183  The 
market structure would then incentivize lowest-cost emission generation to 
enter and compete in the market (e.g., nuclear plants would receive an 
economic advantage over gas and coal plants in selling their generated 
electricity in the market).  Cap-and-trade programs, however, would likely 
pose “a greater administrative burden [for design, operation, and 
compliance] than a carbon price administered by the NYISO.”184  A carbon 
price adder also poses significant challenges, including the determination 
of an appropriate price, appropriate allocation of collected carbon funds to 
customers, and prevention of emissions leakage to neighboring energy 
markets.185  In summary, a carbon charge “would send granular price 
signals on carbon costs to the entire market, penalizing high-emitting 
resources and rewarding low-emitting ones . . . [and] would improve the 
economic efficiency of meeting the state’s energy and environmental 
goals.”186 
In California, “FERC has approved a California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) tariff that incorporates the costs of allowances for that 
state’s economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade program.”187  FERC has allowed 
cap-and-trade programs and related allowance costs to meet the just and 
reasonable standard since the 1990s.188  As a result, states can incorporate 
costs of meeting cap-and-trade requirements in their wholesale energy 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 18–19. 
 183. Id. at 19. 
 184. Id. at 20. 
 185. Id. at 2223 (Determining a carbon price must be modified over time and can reflect working 
group determinations of the social cost of carbon or at a price intended to achieve the states 
decarbonization targets.  Charging for a price of carbon would result in a sizeable fund that can be used 
to mitigate the costs to consumers of increased LMPs throughout the wholesale marketplace.  Applying 
localized carbon pricing to reduce local emissions can result in other states participating in the RGGI to 
increase their emissions and meet RGGI allowances.). 
 186. Id. at 6162. 
 187. Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale 
Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 31 (2017). 
 188. Id. 
ARSHAK CUTTING CARBON FINAL ARTICLE_MCCARTHY ADDS BIO FN%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)12/13/2018  10:37 AM 
200 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 15:1 
transactions. California and CAISO have been successful in increasing 
carbon-free energy procurement while planning nuclear power plant 
closures, conforming to a rapidly changing energy sector and policy 
demands.189 
PJM Proposals for Addressing State Actions Affecting Wholesale Power 
Markets 
PJM recognizes challenges that state policies can pose to wholesale 
energy markets within its territory and has also proposed a carbon-pricing 
framework along with two other proposals that are beyond the scope of this 
note.190  PJM has noted that “[s]tate actions take the form of subsidies or 
out-of-market economic support that currently impedes formation of 
competitive prices in PJM Interconnection’s capacity and energy 
markets.”191  Given the impacts of a direct subsidy to in-state electricity 
generators bidding into federally-regulated regional markets that do not 
provide similar subsidies, PJM has explored an alternative solution that 
balances the goals of maintaining the correct price signal to incentivize and 
maintain the competitive entry necessary to achieve long-term resource 
adequacy while also committing only the quantity of capacity necessary in 
any given delivery year.192 
Specifically, PJM proposes a carbon pricing framework that can be 
adopted in wholesale markets that would (1) establish a price per ton of 
carbon emissions, (2) apply to carbon-emitting suppliers on a per-ton basis 
and be reflected in offers, (3) be revealed in wholesale market prices in the 
participating region or sub-region, and (4) improve the relative 
competitiveness of lower-emitting resources, including those that do not 
emit carbon.193  Implementing a carbon pricing framework, which FERC 
has concluded would be within PJM authority, would establish a 
competitive landscape in which low-carbon or carbon-free energy 
generation sources are rewarded for the attributes they provide to society 
through the market uniformly. ZECs and RECS are arguably uniform in 
 
 189. Eric Gimon, A Guide to the Debate Over Closing Nuclear Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 6,  
2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/a-survivors-guide-to-the-debate-over-existing-
nuclear-plants [https://perma.cc/D8TL-TBQV]. 
 190. Context for PJM Market Design Proposals Responding to State Public Policy Initiatives, at 1-
2, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170612-context-for-pjm 
-market-design-proposals-responding-to-state-public-policy-initiatives.ashx [https://perma.cc/4VZ4-
9Y75]. 
 191. Id. at 1. 
 192. See Bresler, supra note 162. 
 193. Advancing Zero Emissions Objectives through PJM’s Energy Markets: A Review of Carbon-
Pricing Frameworks, at 1, PJM (August 23, 2017), http://pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/ 
special-reports/20170502-advancing-zero-emission-objectives-through-pjms-energy-markets.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/JF3T-3NMB]. 
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their application in that they recognize and reward various carbon-free 
energy generation attributes.  However, as discussed above, a carbon 
pricing scheme implemented at the regional level would unite these two 
concepts, allow for better coordination of state climate change goals, and 
retain faith in regional power markets by establishing uniform prices and 
tariffs.  RTOs/ISOs will have to carefully assess how to best implement 
carbon-pricing within their regions given existing state policies that impact 
wholesale power markets.  While the ZEC program and Illinois’ FEJA 
have survived challenges in federal district and appellate courts194,  FERC, 
PJM, and NYISO are actively considering proposals for carbon-pricing and 
other structural market changes within those regions. 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. wholesale power markets are currently facing the most 
significant challenges to their structure and operation in decades.  
Competition in electricity markets has increased investment in the energy 
sector and incentivized innovation that avoids the environmental harms of 
greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector.  Along with the 
industry, private ownership of power generation sources in the United 
States has grown, and in local economies, retirement of power plants can 
have disproportionate impacts.  FERC, regional commissions, state 
legislatures, and industry stakeholders should collaborate to propose 
solutions for managing existing electricity loads and ensuring economically 
efficient outcomes.  Twenty-first century energy technologies and differing 
state climate change policies demand that FERC allow states to incentivize 
targeted energy generation through subsidies or otherwise while refraining 













 194. See generally, Coalition for Competitive Electricity, et al. v. Zibelman, et al., 906 F.3d 41 (2d 
Cir. 2018); see generally Electric Power Supply Assoc. et al. v. Anthony M. Star et al., 904 F.3d 518 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
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